Constitutional Law—Punitive Damages—Arkansas\u27 Common Law Method of Awarding Punitive Damages May Violate Due Process. Viking Insurance Co. v. Jester, 310 Ark. 317, 836 S.W.2d 371 (1992). by Wilbourn, Penny Brown
University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review 
Volume 15 Issue 3 Article 4 
1993 
Constitutional Law—Punitive Damages—Arkansas' Common Law 
Method of Awarding Punitive Damages May Violate Due Process. 
Viking Insurance Co. v. Jester, 310 Ark. 317, 836 S.W.2d 371 
(1992). 
Penny Brown Wilbourn 
Follow this and additional works at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview 
 Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Penny Brown Wilbourn, Constitutional Law—Punitive Damages—Arkansas' Common Law Method of 
Awarding Punitive Damages May Violate Due Process. Viking Insurance Co. v. Jester, 310 Ark. 317, 836 
S.W.2d 371 (1992)., 15 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 407 (1993). 
Available at: https://lawrepository.ualr.edu/lawreview/vol15/iss3/4 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Bowen Law Repository: Scholarship & Archives. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in University of Arkansas at Little Rock Law Review by an authorized editor of Bowen Law 
Repository: Scholarship & Archives. For more information, please contact mmserfass@ualr.edu. 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PUNITIVE DAMAGES-ARKANSAS' COM-
MON LAW METHOD OF AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES MAY VIOLATE
DUE PROCESS. Viking Insurance Co. v. Jester, 310 Ark. 317, 836
S.W.2d 371 (1992).
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently held in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,' that an $800,000 judgment awarded
under Alabama's common-law system of assessing punitive damages
did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution.' In reviewing Alabama's method of
assessing punitive damages, however, the Court explicitly stated that
constitutional principles may arise in the context of assessing punitive
damages awards.' Significantly, since the Haslip decision, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas has upheld several large punitive damages awards,
including assessments of $1,000,000,1 $500,000,1 $350,000,1 and
$250,000.1 Likewise, in cases arising under Arkansas law, the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals has upheld punitive damages awards of
$4,000,000,8 $1,700,000,1 and $850,000.10 In light of the Supreme
Court's decision in Haslip and the more recent cases of the Supreme
Court of Arkansas and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, this note
discusses the method used by Arkansas courts in awarding punitive
damages and reviewing such awards. Specifically, an analysis of Viking
Insurance Co. v. Jester" raises the issue of whether the Arkansas
method of awarding punitive damages violates due process.
I. Ill S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
2. Id. at 1044.
3. Id. at 1043.
4. B. & F. Eng'g, Inc. v. Cotronco, 309 Ark. 175, 183, 830 S.W.2d 835, 840 (1992).
5. Warhurst v. White, 310 Ark. 546, 552, 838 S.W.2d 350, 352 (1992).
6. Cater v. Cater, 311 Ark. 627, 846 S.W.2d 173 (1993).
7. Viking Ins. Co. v. Jester, 310 Ark. 317, 836 S.W.2d 371 (1992).
8. Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 979 F.2d 1301, 1312 (8th Cir. 1992).
9. Benny M. Estes & Assoc. v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 1228, 1235 (8th Cir. 1992).
10. Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe Int'l Publishing, Inc., 978 F.2d 1065, 1071 (8th Cir.
1992).
II. 310 Ark. 317, 836 S.W.2d 371 (1992). The due process issue did not arise in Cotroneo,
Warhurst, or Cater, the other cases in which the Supreme Court of Arkansas recently affirmed
large punitive damages awards.
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II. FACTS
On August 2, 1989, Ramona Jester was involved in a one-vehicle
collision which damaged her Chevrolet Camaro automobile beyond re-
pair. 2 Ms. Jester reported the accident to her insurer, Viking Insur-
ance Company of Wisconsin ("Viking"). Both parties agreed that Vi-
king would keep the salvage 3 as long as Ms. Jester was paid a just
amount for the car. However, when Ms. Jester and Viking were unable
to come to a mutually satisfactory settlement, Ms. Jester decided to
keep the salvage. Shortly thereafter, she learned that the salvage had
already been sold and partially dismantled. 1'
Ms. Jester hired counsel and filed suit. 5 Her complaint alleged
that Viking Insurance Company was guilty of the first party tort of bad
faith in refusing to settle her claim and of converting her car to its own
use.'
a
Viking answered the complaint, but the trial court later struck the
answer."7 The reasons given by the trial court were that Viking had
violated a court order requiring it to produce its entire claim file and
that Viking's actions had established a pattern of conduct designed to
obstruct the discovery process.1 8 The trial court also entered a default
judgment as to liability against Viking. 9 The case was tried on the
damages issue, and the jury returned a verdict of $1,000 compensatory
damages and $250,000 punitive damages.20
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas,2 Viking argued
that its due process rights were violated because: (1) the trial court
erred in instructing the jury regarding punitive damages and (2) the
state procedure for awarding punitive damages was deficient.22 The
court stated that the only issue properly raised regarding the jury in-
12. 310 Ark. at 321, 836 S.W.2d at 373. Ms. Jester is a single parent of five children who
commutes 34 miles a day to her job at the International Paper Company outside Gurdon,
Arkansas.
13. Salvage is defined as any material or goods (in this case an automobile) saved from
destruction and sold or put to use, as involved in insurance claim settlements. WEBSTER'S NEW
WORLD DICTIONARY 1258 (2d ed. 1972).
14. 310 Ark. at 321-22, 836 S.W.2d at 373-74.
15. Id. at 322, 836 S.W.2d at 374.
16. Id. at 322-23, 836 S.W.2d at 374.
17. Id. at 320, 836 S.W.2d at 372.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 325, 836 S.W.2d at 371.
20. Id. at 320, 836 S.W.2d at 371-72.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 329, 836 S.W.2d at 377.
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struction was whether the trial court erred in refusing to give Viking's
proffered instruction. The court stated that Viking sought to improp-
erly modify its argument and, for the first time on appeal, to argue that
the state procedure for awarding punitive damages violates due pro-
cess.23 The court then affirmed the trial court's judgment.24
III. HISTORY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Although punitive damages have long been a part of the American
legal system, they have always been controversial. 25 One view is that
punitive damages fill the gap between criminal and civil law because
they compensate the victim while serving the purposes of punishment
and deterrence. 26 An opposing view, however, is that punitive damages
are unsound, illegal, arbitrary, economically unnecessary for the plain-
tiff, and economically disastrous, at times, for the defendant.27
In recent history, as the dollar amounts of punitive damages
awards. have been highly publicized, the controversy has intensified.2 8
For example, as a result of the current alleged litigation explosion, aca-
demics are searching for a neutral way to measure litigation regarding
issues such as punitive damages.29
Recently, the constitutionality of punitive damages has been ques-
23. Id. at 329, 836 S.W.2d at 378.
24. 1d. at 332, 836 S.W.2d at 379. Justice Hays dissented, noting that when the trial court
struck Viking's answer, it left Viking defenseless and vulnerable to claims for compensatory and
punitive damages. Additionally, he stated that the sanction was seriously disproportionate to the
offense of failure to deliver the entire claim file. Id. at 332-33, 836 S.W.2d at 379.
25. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, IIl S. Ct. 1032, 1047 (1991) (Scalia, J., concur-
ring). Justice Scalia noted that as recently as the 19th century, commentators disagreed over
whether punitive damages even existed.
26. See generally James B. Sales & Kenneth B. Cole, Jr., Punitive Damages: A Relic that
Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1117 (1984); Melody S. Peacock, Note, Alabama's
Common Law Scheme of Awarding Punitive Damages Does Not Violate Due Process, 14 U. ARK.
LITTLE ROCK L.J. 143, 146 (1991).
27. Sales & Cole, supra note 26, at 1165; Peacock, supra note 26, at 146.
28. Peacock, supra note 26, at 149-50. See Robert E. Goodfriend, Preserving Error in Puni-
tive Damage Cases, 53 TEX. B.J. 1282, 1282 (Dec. 1990). A Cook County, Illinois, study showed a
600% increase in the average punitive damages award between 1980 and 1984. See Bruce Fein &
William B. Reynolds, Punitive Damages Don't Mesh With Due Process, TEX. LAW., May 14,
1990, at 32. Contra Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages,
75 MINN. L. REV. I (1990) (statistical analysis concluding that there has been no increase in
punitive damages awards with regard to incidence or amount). See also David H. Williams, What
Dan Quayle Doesn't Know About Punitive Damages, 14 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 717, 717-18
(1992) (an article arguing that there is no hard evidence to support the conclusion that punitive
damages awards are escalating and suggesting that this was merely a story "[clomprised mainly
of pure unsubstantiated gossip").
29. Andrew Blum, Debate Still Rages On Torts, 15 NAT'L L.J. I, 32-35 (1992).
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tioned in light of insufficient standards governing such awards. 30 In
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Lavoie3s the United States Supreme Court
heard the argument that insufficient standards governing Alabama's
punitive damages awards violated due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3  The case was remanded for a new trial on other
grounds, and the Court did not resolve the due process issue.33 In
Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,3' the constitutionality of
punitive damages was challenged again, but the Court declined to
reach the due process issue because it was not raised and passed upon
in the lower court.3 5 Additionally, in Browning-Ferris Industries v.
Kelco Disposal, Inc.,3" the Court once again deferred the Fourteenth
Amendment question because the issue had not been raised in the dis-
trict court or the court of appeals.37
Subsequently, however, in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Haslip, the Court held that, while the Alabama system for awarding
punitive damages is not violative of due process, the Due Process
Clause may be the basis for a review of punitive damages awards.38
The Court's analysis included an examination of the procedural safe-
guards employed by the Alabama courts in awarding punitive dam-
ages. 39 First, the Court found that the jury instructions provided signifi-
cant jury discretion in awarding punitive damages and in determining
the size of such awards. However, that discretion was confined to the
state's policy concerns of deterrence and retribution.40 Second, the
Court stated that there were sufficiently established post-trial proce-
dures and standards at the trial court level for scrutinizing punitive
damages awards.4' Third, the Court held that there were sufficiently
established standards for appellate review of punitive damages
30. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813 (1986).
31. Id.
32. Id. at 828.
33. Id. at 828-29.
34. 486 U.S. 71 (1988).
35. Id. at 76.
36. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
37. Id. at 277. Nevertheless, four Justices noted concern over the constitutionality of jury
discretion without definite standards. Id. at 280 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring); Id. at 281
(O'Connor & Stevens, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
38. 111 S. Ct. at 1043-44. See also Richard A. Dean, Punitive Damages: The Immediate
Aftermath of Haslip, 34 DEF. 5, 9 (May 1992).





awards." In sum, the Court concluded that these three procedures pro-
vided adequate safeguards for the due process rights of the defendant."3
Although the Court in Haslip did not mandate specific criteria, it
did state that "general concerns of reasonableness and adequate guid-
ance from the court . . . properly enter into the constitutional
calculus.""' The Court noted its concern about punitive damages
awards that "run wild."' 5 Additionally, the Court in Haslip applauded
the adoption in certain jurisdictions of a standard of "clear and con-
vincing evidence ' ' 46 or "beyond a reasonable doubt" as a predicate to
awarding punitive damages.47
Furthermore, Justice O'Connor noted in a dissenting opinion that
such a modest safeguard would make the process significantly more ra-
tional. Specifically, a "clear and convincing" evidentiary requirement
would limit the jury's discretion to the more egregious cases, allow
closer scrutiny of the evidence by reviewing courts, and indicate to the
jury that it must be sure of its factual findings before imposing punitive
damages."
IV. EXAMINATION OF ARKANSAS' METHOD OF AWARDING PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
Arkansas, like Alabama, assesses punitive damages under a com-
mon-law method" that leaves the measurement of the amount of dam-
ages to the discretion of the jury.50 In light of Haslip, the Arkansas
common-law method may be violative of due process of law under the
Fourteenth Amendment because of the lack of adequate guidance from
the court.5 1 Indeed, after the Haslip decision, it was speculated in Ar-
42. Id. at 1045.
43. Id. The Court concluded that this review distinguished Alabama's method from those
systems in Mississippi and Vermont about which the Court had expressed concern. Id. at 1045
n.10.
44. I11 S. Ct. at 1043. See also Peacock, supra note 26, at 158.
45. I11 S. Ct. at 1043. See also Peacock, supra note 26, at 158.
46. Clear and convincing evidence means evidence in which there is no serious or substan-
tial doubt about the correctness of the conclusions drawn from the evidence. Hodges v. S.C. Toof
& Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 n.3 (Tenn. 1992).
47. 11I S. Ct. at 1046 n.l I. The Court noted, however, that the Due Process Clause did not
require that much. Rather, it held that the lesser standard used in Alabama-"reasonably satis-
fied from the evidence"-along with certain procedural and substantive protections, was constitu-
tionally sufficient. Id.
48. 111 S. Ct. at 1064 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 1043. See also Peacock, supra note 26, at 158.
50. Peacock, supra note 26, at 158.
51. I11 S. Ct. at 1043. See also Peacock, supra note 26, at 158.
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kansas that the decision "may compel the Courts, if not the legislature,
to mandate clear standards for the imposition and review of punitive
damages."5
In Union National Bank v. Mosbacher,5 3 the Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals expressed uncertainty about the constitutionality of the Ar-
kansas method of awarding punitive damages in regard to due pro-
cess. 5' The court noted that "[c]onsiderable discretion is given to the
jury in fixing punitive damages in an amount it deems appropriate to
the circumstances."55 Additionally, the court noted that Arkansas ju-
ries are told little more than the defendant's net worth and that the
purpose of punitive damages is to punish and deter.56 The court ex-
pressed uncertainty as to whether Arkansas law applies standards
which impose an adequately definite and meaningful constraint on the
discretion of the jury.5" Finally, the court noted that the Supreme
Court of Arkansas reviews the punitive damages award only to deter-
mine whether the award is so excessive that prejudice by the jury is
suspected or whether the award shocks the conscience of the court. 58
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals discussed the constitutional-
ity of punitive damages in light of Haslip both in Robertson Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co. (Robertson 11)II and Robertson Oil Co. v. Phil-
lips Petroleum Co. (Robertson III).60 First, in Robertson H, it re-
manded the Arkansas case6 1 to the district court for review of the
amount of the punitive damages award under the criteria approved in
Haslip by the United States Supreme Court.
In Robertson H, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted
the holding in Haslip broadly and stated, "[U]nder Haslip we must
evaluate both the jury instructions as to the punitive damages award
and the adequacy of judicial review of the jury's award."6 The court
then noted that the jury instructions in, this Arkansas case only in-
52. Peacock, supra note 26, at 158.
53. 933 F.2d 1440 (8th Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 1447-48.
55. Id. at 1448 (citing Walt Bennett Ford v. Keck, 298 Ark. 424, 768 S.W.2d 28 (1989)).
56. Id. (citing Matthews v. Rodgers, 279 Ark. 328, 651 S.W.2d 453 (1983)).
57. Id. (citing Haslip, III S. Ct. at 1045).
58. Id. The case was remanded to the district court for consideration of the due process
argument. However, a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was
denied on January 13, 1992. 112 S. Ct. 870 (1992) (memorandum opinion).
59. Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 930 F.2d 1342, 1342 (8th Cir. 1991).
60. Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 979 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1993).
61. 930 F.2d at 1342.
62. Id. at 1346.
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formed the jury that it could consider the defendant's financial condi-
tion, without instructing it to consider the character and degree of the
wrong as required by Haslip.
6
On remand, the district court held that the Arkansas method for
awarding punitive damages does not violate due process.64 Although it
did not discuss the sufficiency of the jury instructions in light of Haslip,
the district court held that the Arkansas "shock the conscience" stan-
dard of review does not violate due process. The court noted that the
Supreme Court of Arkansas has enumerated a number of specific in-
quiries which give the standard a definite "shape and texture."65 The
court then "turn[ed] to an application of the criteria developed by the
Arkansas Supreme Court"66 under its general standard and found that
the amount of the Robertson II award did not shock the conscience of
the court.67 However, the district court did not address the fact that
these inquiries68 have not been used together as a consistent standard to
be applied by the trial court in determining whether an award shocks
the conscience. The district court defended the Arkansas method when
the court remarked that "[t]he long and distinguished history of the
Arkansas standard bears testimony to its utility and constitutional-
ity."6 9 The district court did not heed the Court's comment in Haslip
that any practice might be unconstitutional notwithstanding its " 'an-
tiquity' " or " 'the fact of steadfast legislative and judicial
adherence.' "70
Phillips Petroleum appealed the district court order refusing to va-
cate the two punitive damages awards. In Robertson III, Phillips ar-
gued that the Arkansas "shock the conscience" standard does not con-
63. Id. at 1347. Some would prefer a more narrow interpretation of Haslip, specifically,
that the decision does not mandate any particular criteria but merely holds that the method em-
ployed in Alabama does not violate due process. See Peacock, supra note 26, at 159 n.160.
64. 779 F. Supp. 994, 997 (W.D. Ark. 1991).
65. Id. at 996.
66. Id. at 997.
67. Id. at 997-98. Additionally, the court noted its reluctance to disturb the relevant find-
ings because two juries had awarded punitive damages in relatively similar amounts. Id. at 997.
68. The district court noted the following inquiries: the relationship between the relevant
parties, the ratio of the punitive award to the compensatory award, the extent and duration of a
defendant's acts, the deliberateness of the motives, the defendant's motives, the defendant's re-
morse, if any, and the defendant's net worth, along with a long string citation to eleven cases in
which the reviewing court made one or more of the inquiries to judge the propriety of a punitive
damages award. Id. at 996-97.
69. Id. at 996.
70. III S. Ct. at 1043 (quoting Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235, 239 (1970)).
1993]
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strain the jury's discretion when awarding punitive damages and, thus,
is violative of the right to due process. 71
In Robertson 111,72 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals consid-
ered for the second time the constitutionality of the Arkansas method
of awarding punitive damages in light of Haslip. The court stated that
although Arkansas' "shock the conscience" and passion and prejudice
inquiries are broad, the Arkansas cases recognize more specific issues
in their analyses.73 The court stated that even though the factors con-
sidered by the district court in this case were not identical to those in
Haslip, they coincided for the most part. Furthermore, the court stated
that the Haslip factors not considered by the district court were inap-
plicable. Consequently, the court held that the district court's review
satisfied the principles laid down in Haslip.74 Although the court found
that the district court dealt with a number of the more specific issues,75
the court did not directly address the appellant's argument that the
inquiries under the Arkansas method have been "inconsistent and un-
predictable, and that there is no fixed standard" for the measurement
of punitive damages. 76
V. EXAMINATION OF OTHER JURISDICTIONS AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Other jurisdictions have examined their state procedures in light of
the principles outlined in Haslip. Courts in twenty states have ex-
amined standards for assessing punitive damages and the systems in
South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia have, in fact, been struck
down.77 Additionally, Tennessee has changed the standard of evidence
for proof of punitive damages from "a preponderance of the evidence"
to the "clear and convincing" standard. 78
71. Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 979 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1993).
72. Id.
73. The court did not list the specific issues but cited to the most recent district court deci-
sion and approved the district court's conclusion that such specific inquiries give the standard a
definite "'shape and texture." See 779 F. Supp. at 996. See also supra note 68 and accompanying
text.
74. 979 F.2d at 1305-06.
75. Id. at 1304.
76. Id. More recently, in Benny M. Estes & Assoc., the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
cited Robertson III while rejecting an argument that the Arkansas procedures for review of puni-
tive damages awards, both in the trial court and on appeal, are insufficient to satisfy the proce-
dural requirements of the Due Process Clause. 980 F.2d at 1235.
77. Julie G. Shoop, Courts Approve Most Methods for Assessing Punitive Damages, 28
TRIAL 6, June 1992, at 13.
78. Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992). Additionally, punitive dam-
ages have been subjected to substantial statutory reform in recent years. See, e.g., Peacock, supra
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In October 1991, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated a
$100,000 punitive damages award, finding that South Carolina law
lacked meaningful standards and gave juries unfettered discretion in
awarding punitive damages.79 In a later case, however, the Fourth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals approved a more detailed post-verdict review
process which the Supreme Court of South Carolina had adopted to
comply with Haslip.80
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals also vacated a punitive dam-
ages award because Virginia's judicial review procedures were inade-
quate.8 Although the jury instructions satisfied the basic requirements
of Virginia law, the court concluded that the standard of review did not
measure up to the Alabama criteria set out in Haslip.82 It was more
analogous to the Mississippi and Vermont review methods, which asked
merely whether the award is "manifestly and grossly excessive," and
which the Court rejected in Haslip for that very reason.8 3
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals vacated a punitive
damages award because of inadequate standards to guide the trial
court in its review process."' In Fleming Landfill, Inc. v. Games, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals concluded that the state's
courts' only real inquiry was into the possible excessiveness of the
awards and, thus, found it insufficient under Haslip.85 The court also
stated that punitive damages should bear a reasonable relationship to
the potential of harm caused by the defendant's actions. The court re-
marked that "punitive damages must bear a reasonable relationship to
actual damages because compensatory damages provide a reasonable
measure of likely harm." 86 Finally, the court concluded that the state's
note 26, at 157. One reform includes raising the standard of proof to that of "clear and convincing
evidence." E.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60.3701 (Supp. 1990); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80
(Anderson 1991 ).
79. Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp., 947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991).
80. See Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350 (S.C. 1991). In the new South Carolina post-
verdict review scheme, the trial court may consider: (I) the defendant's degree of culpability; (2)
the duration of the conduct; (3) the defendant's awareness or concealment; (4) the existence of
similar past conduct; (5) the likelihood the award will deter the defendant or others from like
conduct; (6) the reasonable relationship between the award and the harm likely to result from
such conduct; (7) the defendant's ability to pay; and (8) any other factors deemed appropriate.
947 F.2d at 106.
81. Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 949 F.2d 1338 (4th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 1339.
83. Id. at 1350.
84. Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991).




appellate courts had been operating under inadequate standards in re-
viewing punitive damages awards.8"
The court in Fleming promised that upon petition, it would review
all punitive damages awards. The court also stated that when reviewing
petitions, it would consider the same factors that the jury and judge are
required to consider, and it directed that all petitions must address
each one of those factors with particularity, summarizing evidence
presented to the jury or to the trial court at the post-judgment review
stage.88
In Hodges v. S. C. Toof & Co.,89 Tennessee abandoned its former
method and adopted one requiring, upon motion of the defendant, a
bifurcation of the punitive damages trial into two phases. In the first
phase, the fact finder determines liability for and the amount of com-
pensatory damages, along with liability for punitive damages. If the
defendant is found liable for punitive damages, the amount of such
damages is determined in the second phase. The new Tennessee method
also requires multi-element jury instructions, a "clear and convincing"
standard of evidence, and a formal review of the award by the trial
judge. 90
In Hodges the Supreme Court of Tennessee found that the higher
standard of proof is appropriate given the dual purpose of punishment
and deterrence. 9' The court then stated that "[f]airness requires that a
defendant's wrong be clearly established before punishment is imposed;
awarding punitive damages only in clearly appropriate cases better ef-
fects deterrence. 92
In Glasscock v. Armstrong Cork Co., the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals found that post-trial review procedures in Texas met the pro-
cedural due process requirements established in Haslip.9a Although
87. Id. at 897.
88. Id. at 899-900. The court noted that: (1) punitive damages should bear a reasonable
relationship to the harm that is likely to result from the defendant's conduct; (2) the jury may
consider the reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; (3) the punitive damages should remove
any profit that resulted from the defendant's wrongful conduct; and (4) punitive damages should
bear a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages. Id. at 899.
The court also noted that any issue not specifically addressed in a petition for review of a
punitive damages award would be deemed waived as a matter of law. Id. at 900.
89. 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn. 1992).
90. Id. at 902.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. 946 F.2d 1085 (5th Cir. 1991). One difference, however, is that Alabama requires trial
courts to state their reasons for either sustaining or interfering with a punitive damages award,
416 [Vol. 15:407
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Texas' procedure is not as extensive as the Alabama criteria, the court
concluded that the differences between the Texas and Alabama proce-
dures did not result in a deprivation of due process. Specifically, the
court noted that in Texas, trial and appellate courts review punitive
awards to determine if they are reasonably proportionate to actual
damages.9 Even more importantly, the court noted that the Texas Su-
preme Court provides standards for courts to use when making this
inquiry. 95
Finally, some interesting post-Haslip cases are ones in which
courts have vacated punitive damages awards because they were too
large. The jury instructions were appropriate, and the procedures were
sufficient for reviewing the award. However, the courts were troubled
by the amount of the awards themselves in relation to the purpose of
punitive damages. 96
For example, in Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander
& Associates, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals vacated a $12.5
million punitive damages award which was fifty times the amount of
the compensatory damages awards because it was excessive.97 The
court noted that it would not uphold a punitive award that is entered
upon proper procedure but, nonetheless, violates due process because it
is disproportionate to both the harm caused and the perniciousness of
the conduct.98
One decision that affirmed a punitive damages award under the
Haslip standards on a substantive due process basis is Eichenseer v.
Reserve Life Insurance Co., from the fifth circuit.99 The Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that the Haslip requirements are "not a vehi-
while Texas trial courts are not required to justify their review on the record.
94. Id. at 1096.
95. Id. at 1099. The consistent standards used in Texas require consideration of the nature
of the wrong, the character of the conduct involved, the degree of culpability, and the extent to
which the conduct offends the public's sense of propriety and justice. Id. at 1098.
96. Dean, supra note 38, at 11. See Mason v. Texaco, Inc., 948 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991)
(reducing a $25 million dollar punitive damages award by one-half, calling it a "staggering sum"
that shocked the judicial conscience); Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 810 P.2d 790 (Nev. 1991) (re-
ducing a $22.5 million punitive damages award to $5 million because the award was dispropor-
tionate to the harmfulness of the defendant's conduct and was a larger sum than necessary to
serve as a deterrent); Jacobs Mfg. Co. v. Sam Brown Co., 792 F. Supp. 1520 (W.D. Mo. 1992)
(vacating a $2.7 million punitive award because it was so unrealistic as to demonstrate irrational
rather than reasonable behavior by the jury, and it bore no rational relationship to the harm likely
to result or the harm that actually occurred).
97. 596 A.2d 687 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
98. Id. at 710.
99. 934 F.2d 1377 (5th Cir. 1991).
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cle for expansive appellate review of punitive awards" but a "narrow
channel for appellate review."' 100 The court further stated that the pur-
pose of the Haslip requirements was to ensure that under the circum-
stances of the particular case, the punitive damages award is not
grossly excessive or unreasonable.101
A summary of where the law stands after Haslip was given by
Judge Johnson in Eichenseer as follows:
Thus, after Haslip, an award of punitive damages is constitutional if
the circumstances of the case indicate that the award is reasonable
and the procedure used in assessing and reviewing the award imposes
a definite and meaningful constraint on the discretion of the
factfinder. This is a fact intensive analysis. On appellate review, a
court must consider the nature of the wrong and the status of the
parties. The touchstone of constitutionality under Haslip is not the
amount of the award in the abstract. The size of an award and the
relationship between the award and the amount of compensatory
damages are relevant facts in determining whether the award is con-
stitutional, but these facts are not dispositive. 10
Indeed, punitive damages awards have received even more scrutiny
since Haslip.'0' As a result, many decisions developing procedural due
process issues have come down in various states, and Arkansas is no
exception. Viking Insurance Co. v. Jester is just one Arkansas case that
raises due process questions.
VI. REASONING OF THE COURT IN VIKING
On appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, Viking complained
that its right of due process was violated.' The court 5 rejected Vi-
king's challenge and affirmed the decision of the trial court.
Specifically, Viking complained that the jury instruction regarding
punitive damages provided inadequate guidance to the jury and vio-
lated Viking's constitutional right to due process. 06 At trial, Viking
100. Id. at 1382.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1381-82.
103. Dean, supra note 38, at 13.
104. 310 Ark. at 329, 836 S.W.2d at 377.
105. Justice Dudley delivered the opinion of the court. Justice Hays filed a dissenting opin-
ion. 310 Ark. at 317, 332-33, 836 S.W.2d at 371, 380.
106. 310 Ark. at 329, 836 S.W.2d at 377. The appeal by Viking to the Supreme Court of
Arkansas presented the following points:
I. The trial court erred in entering sanctions of striking the answer, declaring a default as to
liability, and awarding fees and costs.
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had asked the court to give its proposed instruction in light of the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Haslip, but the trial court refused.1"7 On ap-
peal, the court held that whether the trial court erred in refusing to
give Viking's proffered instruction was the only issue raised. The court
also stated that Viking sought to modify its argument and argue for the
first time on appeal that the Arkansas procedure for awarding punitive
damages violates due process."0
After addressing the procedural law, the court then turned to the
substantive law. The court discussed the three criteria by which to
judge whether a particular award is violative of the Due Process Clause
as established in Haslip:
(1) Whether the jurors were given sufficient guidance and instruction
on punitive damages so that they could reach a rational decision ...
(2) Whether there were sufficiently established post-trial procedures
and standards in the trial court for scrutinizing punitive damage
awards. . . . (3) Whether there are sufficiently established standards
for appellate review.' 9
The court only considered that part of the first criterion relating to
the trial court's failure to give defendant's proffered instruction.1 The
2. The second point of appeal contained two subparts: First, the trial court erred in giving an
instruction to the jury on the issue of punitive damages because there was not sufficient evidence
to warrant such an instruction. Second, the jury instruction violated Viking's right of due process.
3. The punitive damages were excessive and demonstrated that the jury was motivated by passion
and prejudice.
Id. at 325-28, 836 S.W.2d at 375-79.
107. Id. at 331, 836 S.W.2d at 379. The instruction given to the jury was based upon Ark.
Model Jury Instr. Civil 3d 2217.
108. 310 Ark. at 329, 836 S.W.2d at 378.
109. Id. at 330, 836 S.W.2d at 378 (citing Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, Ill S. Ct.
1032 (1991)).
110. Id. at 330-31, 836 S.W.2d at 378. The defendant's proffered instruction was then re-
cited by the court as follows:
In addition to compensatory damages for any actual loss that Ramona Jester may
have sustained, she asks for punitive damages from Viking Insurance Company of Wis-
consin. Punitive damages may be imposed to punish a wrongdoer and to deter others
from similar conduct. In order to recover punitive damages from Viking Insurance
Company of Wisconsin, Ramona Jester has the burden of proving:
That Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin engaged in affirmative
misconduct which was dishonest, malicious, or oppressive in an attempt to
avoid its liability under the insurance policy issued to Ramona Jester. Actual
malice is that state of mind in which a person's conduct is characterized by
hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge. Malice may be inferred from conduct
and surrounding circumstances.
You are not required to assess punitive damages against Viking Insur-
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court found that the instruction given and the proposed instruction used
the same language in explaining the nature and purpose of punitive
damages: punishment and deterrence. Further, the court concluded
that the only difference was that the actual instruction told the jurors
they "may" impose punitive damages while the proposed instruction
told them that they were not required to assess punitive damages but
"may" do so."'
Finally, the court held that under Haslip, there was no material
difference between the instruction given and the proposed instruction,
and thus, the trial court did not err in refusing Viking's proffered in-
struction.112 Consequently, the court affirmed the decision of the trial
court, rejecting all of Viking's arguments.11
VII. SIGNIFICANCE
There must be a rational procedure for determining and awarding
punitive damages. 1" Since the United States Supreme Court, in Has-
lip, held that the Due Process Clause may be the basis for a review of
punitive damages awards, 1 5 the procedures used in many states have
been challenged.
It is possible that the Arkansas method for awarding punitive
damages violates due process. An examination of Viking and the Ar-
kansas method, when they are compared to the challenged procedures
used by other states raises this debatable issue. Additionally, Viking
raises the question of what an attorney must do to preserve the due
process question for appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas.
First, the Arkansas method may provide inadequate guidance to
the jury in assessing punitive damages, thus resulting in unbridled jury
ance Company of Wisconsin but you may do so if justified by the evidence. If
you find that punitive damages are justified by the [The proffered instruction
ends in mid-sentence.].
Id.
11I. Id. at 331, 836 S.W.2d at 379.
112. Id. at 332, 836 S.W.2d at 379.
113. The court rejected Viking's first point on appeal and held that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in imposing the sanctions, in entering a default judgment against Viking, or in
awarding fees and costs. Viking's third point was also rejected. The court held that the punitive
damages were not excessive and that it had always scrutinized punitive awards. Further, the court
stated that the financial condition of the defendant is a proper matter to consider. The court then
concluded that the damages awarded were not excessive in view of the state's interest in punishing
the conduct of Viking and deterring others from engaging in such conduct. Id. at 332, 836 S.W.2d
at 379.
114. Peacock, supra note 26, at 160.
115. II1 S. Ct. at 1043-44.
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discretion. In Mosbacher, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals ques-
tioned the constitutional adequacy of the Arkansas method because of
the considerable discretion given to the jury." 6 Viking raised the ques-
tion again.
The instruction given in Viking provided the jury with minimal
guidance in awarding punitive damages. It advised: (1) that punitive
damages are imposed for purposes of punishment and deterrence; (2)
that the plaintiff must prove that Viking engaged in misconduct that
was dishonest, malicious, or oppressive; and (3) that the jurors may
consider the financial condition of Viking." 7 This instruction gave the
jury considerable discretion in its determination of punitive damages.
Conversely, the Court in Haslip, while approving the instruction
given in the Alabama case, noted that the jury was not given unlimited
discretion. The Court also noted that evidence of wealth was excluded
and that the jurors were directed to "take into consideration the char-
acter and the degree of the wrong as shown by the evidence and neces-
sity of preventing similar wrong."" 8 The Arkansas scheme, by contrast,
imposes no such evidentiary restrictions.
The instruction given in Viking did require the jury to consider the
character of the wrong but did not do so sufficiently. Specifically, it did
not stress consideration of "the degree of the wrong as shown by the
evidence."" ' 9
The instruction proffered by Viking was more complete and would
have come closer to the instruction that was approved in Haslip.20
116. 933 F.2d at 1448.
117. 310 Ark. at 331, 836 S.W.2d at 379.
118. I11 S. Ct. at 1044.
119. See id.
120. The complete instruction proffered by the defendant stated:
In addition to compensatory damages for an actual loss that Ramona Jester may
have sustained, she asks for punitive damages from Viking Insurance Company of Wis-
consin. Punitive damages may be imposed to punish a wrongdoer and to deter others
from similar conduct. In order to recover punitive damages from Viking Insurance
Company of Wisconsin, Ramona Jester has the burden of proving:
That Viking Insurance Company of Wisconsin engaged in affirmative misconduct
which was dishonest, malicious or oppressive in an attempt to avoid its liability under
the insurance policy issued to Ramona Jester. Actual malice is that state of mind in
which a person's conduct is characterized by hatred, ill will or a spirit of revenge.
Ramona Jester's claim for punitive damages against Viking Insurance Company of
Wisconsin cannot be based upon a good faith denial, offers to compromise a disputed
claim or for other honest errors of judgment by Viking Insurance Company. Neither
can Ramona Jester's claim be based upon negligence or bad judgment so long as Viking
Insurance Company of Wisconsin acted in good faith.
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First, it instructed that if punitive damages were justified by the evi-
dence, in fixing the amount the jury must consider whether there is a
reasonable relationship between the punitive damages award and the
harm likely to result, as well as the harm that actually occurred.'21
This came closer to the criteria approved in Haslip that recognized the
"necessity of preventing similar wrong."' 22 Second, Viking's proposed
instruction advised the jury to consider the degree of reprehensibility of
Viking's conduct, the duration of that conduct, any concealment, and
the existence and frequency of similar past wrongful conduct.1 23 The
"duration" and "frequency" elements of the proposed instruction re-
lated to the "degree of the wrong" consideration in Haslip. The "repre-
hensibility" element exemplified the Haslip requirement that the jury
consider the "character" of the wrong as shown by the evidence.124
By comparison, in the fourth circuit case Mattison v. Dallas Car-
rier Corp. in which the court found South Carolina's procedure inade-
quate, the jury instruction was strikingly similar to the one approved in
Viking.'25 In Mattison, the court found that the combination of undi-
rected jury instructions resulting in unfettered jury discretion and the
state's lack of meaningful standards in awarding punitive damages de-
nied the defendant due process.126
You are not required to assess punitive damages against Viking Insurance Com-
pany of Wisconsin but you may do so if justified by the evidence.
If you find that punitive damages are justified by the evidence, consider the follow-
ing in fixing the amount:
(I) Whether there is a reasonable relationship between the punitive damages
award and the harm likely to result from Viking's conduct as well as the
harm that has actually occurred to Ramona Jester; (2) The degree of repre-
hensibility of Viking's conduct, the duration of that conduct, Viking's aware-
ness, any concealment and the existence and frequency of similar past con-
duct; (3) The profitability to Viking of the wrongful conduct; (4) The
financial condition of Viking; (5) All the costs of litigation; and (6) The mo-
tive of Viking in undertaking the conduct.
Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 234-35, Viking Ins. Co. v. Jester, 310 Ark. 317, 836 S.W.2d
371 (1992) (No. 91-253).
121. Id.
122. III S. Ct. at 1044.
123. Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 234-35.
124. See id.
125. See 947 F.2d at 105. The court emphasized the circumstances under which punitive
damages are available, the purpose of punitive damages, and the standard of proof required to
award punitive damages. Then, the court's only instruction in regard to quantification was "Itlhe
amount of punitive damages assessed against any defendant may be such sum as you believe will
serve to punish that defendant and deter it and others from like conduct." Id.
126. Id. at 95. Additionally, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that because no
guidance is required by South Carolina law, a reviewing court could not rationally decide that the
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The second basis for review of the Arkansas method is that the
Arkansas procedure for post-trial review of punitive damages awards
may be constitutionally defective. The Court in Haslip indicated that
the constitutionality of a punitive damages award will turn on the exis-
tence of some procedure that ensures "meaningful and adequate review
by the trial court whenever a jury has fixed the punitive damages."1 7
The Court discussed a series of specific factors "appropriate for the
trial court's consideration"' 28 that the Alabama Supreme Court had
established in a previous decision. Under the Alabama system, both the
trial and appellate courts are directed to apply a clear list of
standards."2 9
In sharp contrast to the detailed standards for review used in Ala-
bama, Arkansas trial courts are only guided by the general question of
whether the award "shocks the conscience of the court or demonstrates
that the jurors were motivated by passion or prejudice."'' 30 Signifi-
cantly, the Arkansas standard is strikingly similar to the Vermont and
Mississippi methods that were criticized in Haslip. The Supreme Court
noted in Haslip that under those systems, an award would only be set
aside if it were grossly excessive or when "it evince[d] passion, bias and
prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience.' 3' The
Court criticized such systems as insufficient. Consequently, the Arkan-
sas method may lack the detailed standards for review required by
Haslip.
Third, the Arkansas method for appellate review may be unconsti-
tutional because of its lack of consistent application of "detailed sub-
stantive standards.' 32 Rather, the Arkansas appellate review method
employs a variety of standards, but no defined, consistent standard or
amount was excessive without merely substituting its own notion of excessiveness for that of the
jury. Id. at 105.
Notably, after Mattison was argued, the South Carolina Supreme Court, in Gamble v. Ste-
venson, adopted a clear and convincing standard of evidence. It also announced new procedures
for post-trial review, in order to meet those approved in Haslip. Id. at 106-107. See Gamble v.
Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350 (S.C. 1991).
127. Haslip, Ill S. Ct. at 1044.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1045.
130. Robertson Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 930 F.2d 1342, 1346 (8th Cir. 1991). See
also O'Neal Ford v. Davie, 299 Ark. 45, 49, 770 S.W.2d 656, 659 (1989) (quoting W.M. Bashlin
Co. v. Smith, 277 Ark. 406, 423, 643 S.W.2d 526, 534 (1982)).
131. Haslip, Ill S. Ct. at 1045 n.10 (quoting Banker's Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw,
483 So.2d 254, 278 (Miss. 1985)).
132. Id. at 1045.
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set of standards.13 3
The Arkansas method is indistinguishable from those that were
struck down in Virginia and West Virginia after Haslip. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found the Virginia standard to be more anal-
ogous to the Mississippi and Vermont review methods.1 34 The West
Virginia state court's only real inquiry was into the excessiveness of the
award, which the Supreme Court held to be insufficient in Haslip.'3 5
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia struck down the
state's method of appellate review because of inadequate standards. 3
These systems strongly resemble the Arkansas appellate review system,
which employs no defined, consistent standard or set of standards. 3
Although the United States District Court for the Western Dis-
trict of Arkansas3 8 and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals have de-
fended the history of the Arkansas method, 39 neither court addressed
Arkansas' lack of a fixed, consistent standard for assessing punitive
damages. Even though Arkansas courts examine a "number of specific
inquiries,"'' 4 0 the lack of a fixed, predictable, and consistent standard
may render the Arkansas method constitutionally defective.
Alternatively, the adoption of a "clear and convincing" evidentiary
standard in punitive damages cases would do much to ensure the con-
stitutionality of such awards. In his concurrence in National Bank of
Commerce v. McNeill Trucking Co.,'' Justice Dudley suggested that
Arkansas adopt the clear and convincing evidentiary standard for puni-
tive damages. Additionally, he suggested a procedural change to the
bifurcation of punitive damages trials. Although Justice Dudley's sug-
gestions were made in a concurring opinion, he stated that he hoped his
133. Robertson, 779 F. Supp. at 997.
134. Johnson v. Hugo's Skateway, 949 F.2d 1338, 1351 (4th Cir. 1991) (citing Haslip, 11l
S. Ct. at 1045 n.10). See also Dean, supra note 38, at 10.
135. Garnes v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 908 (W. Va. 1992). See Haslip, 11l
S. Ct. at 1044. See also Dean, supra note 38, at II.
136. 413 S.E.2d at 908. The trial court and appellate review methods were found to be
neither meaningful nor adequate because jury verdicts would not be set aside as excessive unless
they were monstrous, enormous, beyond all measure, unreasonable, outrageous, and manifestly
showed jury passion, prejudice or corruption, and had "no foundation in the evidence so as to
evince passion, prejudice or corruption in the jury." Id.
137. Robertson, 779 F. Supp. at 997 (discussing various standards of review that have been
used, but noting that the courts have not developed a defined, consistent standard.) See also supra
note 68 and accompanying text.
138. 779 F. Supp. at 996.
139. Robertson Oil Co., 979 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1992).
140. Id. at 1303; 779 F. Supp. at 996.
141. 309 Ark. 80, 828 S.W.2d 584 (1992).
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suggestions for change would be brought before the court for
consideration.142Notably, in Peoples Bank & Trust Co. v. Globe, while affirming a
punitive damages award, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that the District Court for the Western District of Arkansas had re-
quired the jury to determine, by clear and convincing evidence, if
Globe had acted with actual malice in publishing certain statements
that were at issue in the case. Additionally, the court emphasized that
only after the jury had found actual malice did the court then instruct
the jury as to the factors to be considered in awarding punitive dam-
ages. 143 The cautious approach taken by the district court in this case
and the attention it received in the eighth circuit's opinion suggest that
adoption of these two procedural safeguards would alleviate due pro-
cess concerns when punitive damages are awarded.
Arkansas' neighbor state of Tennessee has actually avoided the
strict scrutiny of punitive damages by adopting a clear and convincing
standard of evidence. 1 4 In Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., Tennessee
adopted the same ideas Justice Dudley proposed for an enhanced evi-
dentiary standard and bifurcation of the punitive damages issue.'45
Hodges is representative of the increasing number of cases abandoning
the common-law schemes in favor of a standard unquestionably consis-
tent with the due process rights discussed in Haslip. Arkansas could do
much to ensure the constitutionality of its punitive damages awards by
adopting a standard of clear and convincing evidence.
Even though the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Robertson
III, summarily approved the Arkansas method of awarding punitive
damages, Justice Dudley's concurrence in McNeill hints that the Su-
preme Court of Arkansas would consider following Tennessee in avoid-
ing the strict scrutiny of punitive damages by adopting a "clear and
convincing" evidentiary standard and a procedural change to the bifur-
cation of punitive damages trials. At the very least, Justice Dudley's
expression of hope that his suggestions for change will be brought
before the court presents a challenge to Arkansas lawyers. 46
142. 309 Ark. at 89, 828 S.W.2d at 590 (Dudley, J., concurring).
143. 978 F.2d at 1071.
144. See Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992).
145. Id. See National Bank of Commerce v. McNeill Trucking Co., 309 Ark. 80, 89-93,
828 S.W.2d 584, 588-91 (1992) (Dudley, J., concurring).
146. Ironically, it should be noted that Justice Dudley wrote the majority opinion in Viking.
However, because the court found that the defendant did not properly object to the Arkansas
procedure for awarding punitive damages, Justice Dudley did not address the issue in the Viking
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Fina-lly, in light of Viking's objection to the jury instruction that
was given, the question arises of what an attorney must do to preserve
the issue for appeal to the Supreme Court of Arkansas. After the court
refused Viking's proffered jury instruction, Viking made the following
objection:
Defendants proffer Defendant's Proposed Instruction No. 1 on the ba-
sis that to submit the issue of punitive damages without some defined,
established, recognized guidelines is violative of the defendant's right
to due process as set forth in Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company
v. Haslip, a recent Supreme Court case, as well as other authorities
cited in support of this instruction. 17
The objection was overruled by the trial court. On appeal, the Supreme
Court of Arkansas refused to address the issue of whether the state
procedure for awarding punitive damages violates due process because
the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. 48
At first blush, it seems that the objection could not have been
more thorough in preserving the issue for appeal. However, a closer
examination of the objection reveals a possible reason for the court's
refusal to recognize the issue on appeal. The objection merely argued
that submitting the issue of punitive damages without some defined
guidelines was violative of the defendant's right to due process. No spe-
cific mention was made of the Arkansas common-law method of award-
ing punitive damages as a whole; the objection only mentioned the jury
instruction aspect.
In conclusion, Viking suggests that, to preserve this issue, the en-
tire method used by Arkansas must be set out in the objection as vio-
lating due process rights. Accordingly, it seems that even if the specific
objection is to one aspect of the method, such as jury instructions, the
objection must also set out trial court and appellate review procedures
as violative of due process, in order to preserve the issue for appeal.
Penny Brown Wilbourn
opinion. Therefore, it seems that he is still waiting for the right case in which his suggestions for
change will be properly brought before the court.
147. Abstract and Brief for Appellant at 287-B.
148. 310 Ark. at 329, 836 S.W.2d at 378.
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